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ST A ] I lit- U IAJ i : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : 
"'V - : Case i* ' 6 
J E: K v Y i"1  A u in, i:, ' : Ca t e g c i
 T . , 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
D e f e n d a n t , 1" " i
 i I Mb i t 1 , yu «^;ii led w | M . • * n<I 
d e g r e e murde r r a f i r i t dei j iee l e l u n y , m v i o l a t i o n uf Utah Code 
Ann. S76-5-2M J Q 9 JH » . 
Dt jfenMii f w i rnin ' iCl I'.I I • H< ni It «u tj* ,iuidtM in a 
j u r y t r i a l he lei Aj. r l J 1 4 - : 4 , I^IC, n t h e Second J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , ii and for Weber County , S t a t e oi Utah , t h e 
H» - . - - Defendant was s e n t e n c e d by 
Judge Roth - - •*-• i - i \ ^ y e a r s tD i i f e w i th a one y e a r 
enhancement L~ *^» coiiot-: * . * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 24 , 198S, at about 9: JU a . n u , Kevin 
Youngren , a s a r g e n t i n t h e Utuli Hi q t n %  * i > l a t i t i w.i w r^  1 k in ^ hmm 
f i i^L church when he saw h i s n e i g h b o r , t h e d e f e n d a n t , waving and 
c a l l i n g t o Uim ! I i , 2 5 7 - 5 8 ) , Tin- defendant was c r y i n g and 
e x c i t e d . He s t a t e d t u Mi m i n i j t f n , * \ n lm \ i ,iut i n In i , m\ , " 
(Ti , 21 I * . When asked wheit wai; wiung, de fendan t r e p l i e d , "i 
t h i n k she i s d e a d , " (Tr . 261. i • defendant d i r e c t e d Mr. Yor . : r t a 
t o t h e nidbt- bedruom whu i In njini t, hm v i i f iinr ' l d u d e l t ' . . ^ 
l y i n g ^ n t h . ; l o o i wi th her i e e t upon t h e tuol uf t h e bed (Tr , 
264). Mr. Youngren was unable to detect a pulse (Tr. 264-265). 
Defendant stated that he knew he should not have moved the 
victim, but had done so in an attempt to render first aid (Tr. 
265). Mr. Youngren made no further attempt to examine the victim 
noting only a wound on the left side of her face, extending from 
jaw to cheekoone (Tr. 268). 
Defendant then voluntarily stated, "We had a big fight. 
She said she had been sleeping with someone, and then she does 
this." (Tr. 268). Defendant went on to explain that he had been 
in the shower when he heard a shot. He ran to the bedroom where 
he saw Claudette attempting to load a 30-30 rifle. Defendant 
attempted to grab the gun, a struggle ensued and the gun 
discharged (Tr. 270-271). 
Mr. Youngren called the Highway Patrol dispatcher to 
report the death. Before finishing the call, a paramedics team 
and an officer with the Riverdale Police Department arrived (Tr. 
274-275). Paramedic Mark Hoskins and Officer Don Anderson 
checked the body for a pulse but made no attempt to further 
investigate the scene. 
Defendant again volunteered the same story he had 
earlier given to Mr. Youngren (Tr. 336-337). Although all three 
men believed the suicide story at that time (Tr. 276, 338), there 
were several unusual items that attracted their attention. 
Defendant was dressed only in dark polyester pants and appeared 
to be wet (TP# 261). No blood was observed on the defendant (Tr. 
261, 335) although several drops of blood were seen on the front 
porch (Tr. 282, 340). The shower in the bathroom was on and the 
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shower c u r t a i n was open (Tr . 2fH, 96fi} , The volume of t h e 
t e l e v i s i o n was so loud tha t c o n v e r s a t i o n an< >i> i t. h" T" n was 
d i f f i c u l t ( i i ;Mj , i i v - i n » lM>i i Trie t e m p e r a t u r e of t h e house 
was very wann and t h e t h e r m o s t a t r ead 85 d e c r e e s (Tr • 3 4 * ' , In 
a d d i t i o r i i d 1 J i e war. b i n n i n g i n t lm WHIM b i n n i n g st uvt IT t 4 ) . 
Shin I i j t hei edi t v r , t h e de fendan t WJS t a k e n t o t he 
h o s p i t a l . Defendant c o n t i n u e d t o e x p l a i n C l a a d e t t p ' s dea th as a 
c o m b i n a t i o n s u i c i d e - a c c i d e n t '1 * ^ 
D'hi iM t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o r L . r ' s d e a t h • :* 
v i c t i m ' s head was moved and a n o t h e r wojn * wf ,L founu a t m e Ode* 
of trie v i c t i m ' s head I'II e.n i , • >, i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n 
»•* iei t h i s was an e n t r a n c e ur . * > - • ur: :i : ; . - " - ; - *- . 
503) - Alsu f t h e bood and f l e s h f r agmen t s found on t 
c e i l i n g oi Urn bedroom WMM mil . : minent- ?<= t h a t . ^ ^ ^ . . 
found a t s u i c i d e s c e n e s where a ;*. n.;. * e. t a .: . :> *  , ^u^/ . 
F i n a l l y , D e t e c t i v e .Sheldon Smith and Sdrqent W i 1 1 j 
a t t e m p t e d t: <» nit--cj.-.. u i / i c t - i m ' s r each an the gun was 
d e t e r m i n e d that, t h e v i c t i m would have been u n a b l e • e a r n t h e 
t r i g g e r wi th t h e b a r r e l l oi t h e .^ii p l r jee l agaiiuM tier cheek (Tr 
4 ( 1 9 " <1 I 11 " . - .. . . ; • 
L a t e r t h a t a f t e r n o o n , a f t e r t h e p o J i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
had been comple t ed , Hi YouiMieii ami sMvei.il in i g h b o r s went t o 
t in ' Aid h holm ti> c l e a n ( l i , J V » The b u l l e t . 1 had p u n c t u i e d a 
w a t e r b e d i n t lie bedroom. While i l e a n i n g
 r a t u l i e t h o l e was tonnd 
n tii< wood on t h e water bed, %1i i' inn<iei wd{u a l s o a b l e t o 
d e l v i n i in where t h e b u l l e t had s t i u c k t h e c a r p e t i n g ITr . 2 9 0 ) . 
When t h e q u i l t was p i c k e d up , s e v e r a l b u l l e t s i e l l t. f 
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(Tr. 291). The downward trajectory of the bullets (Tr. 290) and 
the numer of bullets found at the scene of the suicide made Mr. 
Youngren uneasy about certain portions of defendant's story (Tr. 
294). 
About 4:30 p.m. on November 24, defendant, with his 
attorney present, defendant gave a statement to the police (Tr. 
416-417). The statement given was similar to the explanation 
that defendant had given throughout the day, but did contain 
additional information and changes. Defendant indicated that 
when the incident occurred he had wanted to kill himself but his 
preliminary preparations were interrupted by his two sons (Tr. 
423). Defendant stated that the victim had been using drugs (Tr. 
426). Defendant denied that an argument had occured that morning 
(Tr. 431-32), and when questioned about Claudette's possible 
infedility, defendant stated, "not that I can prove." (Tr. 430). 
Rudy Reit, Chief Investigator for the Medical 
Examiner's office, testified that the first bullet wound to occur 
was the wound to Claudette's cheek (Tr. 619-20). The wound 
damaged skin and subcutaneous tissue, but did not damage any bone 
(Tr. 621). The pattern of stippling on the victim's face and 
neck indicated that the victim was 18 to 24 inches from the 
muzzle of the rifle when it was fired (Tr. 597, 639). In the 
opinion of both Mr. Riet and Dr. Armando Salazar, Forensic 
Pathologist for the State Medical Examiner's Office, this would 
would likely have rendered the victim unconscious (Tr. 612, 641). 
The second bullet wound was an entrance wound at the 
back of the victim's head (Tr. 612, 622-23), and occurred when 
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t h e weapon wcu ' -• • .-.- v i c t i m ( T r . 5 9 1 , 
62J')- Defendant ^ c subsequen t .* / c n a r g e : w i t : S e c i M L-rj .ee 
Murder , 
I i in M [ tin ii i 1  I i he Mi ii i c i J i IN J a mo*" i on i 1 i m4 ^ 
request in^ L^r ; t a*, * si e separate statements made L2 
the : e > a s - : • evidence \ u . ^ z ; , 
cour *>tion- °nly t n* st;c..tii Cdit^^i , raised 
any real question ot admissibility, I: ,*a:.egory included 
statements made by the deceased s ' 
i - * u . hP woii] . . 2 2 2 - 2 3 ) . The 
cour 1 : , . . e , ; \; = t . t a t e m e n t s c o n t a i n s
 t. -he s e v e n t h c a t e g o r y 
were . r. a d m i s s i b l e . : -- ;* .»: - . J I 
a J q iu iiirr ,i :i l ui b e l l " - d e f e n s e , t h e a d m i s s i b i l : \ cu^ia L*. ~ e c o n s i d e r e d 
(Tr . 2 5 0 - 5 1 ) . 
Ai *•
 tiM* d . . . tx j i a n a t i o ^ of *-^o 
e v e n t s o c c u r , , - . . . - tovembe: - •*»• ' . . a i m i n g , 
, I qot d f i a i d t o t e i 1 anybody e x a c t l y what happens I ," (Tr . 
1302) M t i i il -I* l^ i i l i ' i t n o t i f i e d t h a t w h i l e p r e p a r i n g t o 
t a k e d sriower , he s t e p p e d i n t o t h e hallway t o qe t a t owe he 
saw C l a u d e t t e s t a n d i n a in t h e bedroom u i 1 hi ! > i n J I M t. 
i l l i i. '1 * } , ! H" I eiiLidiu walked i n t o t he beuioom and when C l a u d e t t e 
t u r n e d t o face de fendan t she was h o l d i n g a qtiii Ti . l«ILM 
Defendant t e s t i f i e d , t h a t she s t e p p e d t nw. id. I J I . , j. i • > v .•: 
)UM I " hj'i ap t i t d t e d "J am t i r e d ol h e a t i n g you t h r e a t e n : * : : 1 
y o u r s e l l , If you want t o d i e , h e i e i s t h e g u n . " She t h e - > .an 
h o l l e r i n g and p u s h i n u the pin tnwiirds del •. miaul M r , l . ' y ^ i , 
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Defendant claimed he backed away from Claudette because 
he was afraid (Tr. 1294-95)• Defendant claimed he decided he 
would commit suicide to show the deceased (Tr. 1296). Defendant 
then jumped towards Claudette to get the gun (Tr. 1296). 
According to defendant, a struggle ensued and the gun discharged 
(Tr. 1296). Defendant acknowledged that he could see something 
wrong with Claudette's cheek, (Tr. 1297) but the struggle 
continued. Defendant claimed that Claudette had a strong hold 
and would not let go of the gun (Tr. 1297) . During the struggle 
the gun discharged a second time. 
At the close of defendant's testimony, the State 
renewed its motion requesting that the pre-death statements made 
by Claudette be admitted. The court stated that generally such 
statements would be admissible if defendant presents a defense of 
self-defense. The court further stated that while the 
defendant's argument was not clearly self-defense, there were 
elements similar to self-defense (Tr. 1390) and he would admit 
the statements (Tr. 1390-91). 
The court acknowledged that the statement in question 
was prejudicial, but defendant was in court and available to 
explain what occurred. Further, the statements were relevant to 
the victim's state of mind (Tr. 1392). 
Subsequent to the ruling the State called John March as 
a rebuttal witness. Mr. March testified concerning a conversa-
tion with Claudette one week prior to her death wherein Claudette 
indicated that she had decided to leave defendant (Tr. 1441). 
When asked about defendant's response, Claudette stated that the 
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defendant was "really upset," and had threatened to kill her if 
she moved out (Tr. 1442), 
The jury found defendant guilty of second degree 
murder. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The pre-death statements by the deceased were properly 
admitted as evidence of the decedent's state of mind since the 
defendant initially testified that the deceased committed suicide 
and later testified that he was afraid of the deceased and the 
gun discharged accidently killing the deceased. The statements 
were also admissible under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2), an admission 
by a party opponent. Assuming this Court finds the statements 
were improperly admitted into evidence, any error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE PRE-DEATH 
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DECEASED 
Prior to trial the State filed a motion in limine to 
introduce evidence pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 803(3) (1986) (R. 
40). Specifically, the State wished to introduce the victim's 
pre-death statement that the defendant threatened to kill her if 
she ever left him. Judge Roth heard arguments on the motion (Tr. 
218) and ruled that the statements would not be admissible as a 
part of the State's case, however, if the defendant were to raise 
the issue of self-defense then the court would reconsider the 
admissibility of the statements (Tr. 251). 
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After the defendant testified, the court ruled that 
although the defendant did not present a clear self-defense 
argument, the defense presented by the defendant had elements 
similar to self-defense and thus, the statements would be 
admitted (Tr. 1390-91). The court reasoned that if the 
statements were made then "the decedent would not likely be the 
aggressor and would not likely aggressively present a gun to the 
defendant, taunting him and badgering him with the gun in the 
manner described by the defendant" (Tr. 1391). 
Based upon this ruling the State presented the 
following testimony by John March on rebuttal: 
A. What she had indicated to me was that she 
had definitely decided then that she was 
going to leave. And like I testified before, 
that she believed she had picked out an 
apartment and everything. And I asked her 
then "well what's going to happen?" And she 
indicated to me that Jerry was really upset, 
that this time he had threatened before, but 
this time—normally he threatened that he was 
going to commit suicide. And this time he 
threatened that he was going to kill her. He 
threatened to kill her if she moved out. 
(Tr. 1442). 
John March also made the following statement : 
A. . . . And this Tuesday she was telling me 
about how excited about moving into an 
apartment she was, and that she thought she 
had found one. She told me of an incident 
with Jerry threatening to kill her if she did 
move away, but she wasn't going to be worried 
about it. She was going definitely to move 
out and not even worry about it. 
Q. Claudette told you that? 
A. Yes, she—she at this time indicated that 
she definitely had to decide and get ahold of 
her life from this point. That the threats 
aoout being concerned about Jerry committing 
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suicide she couldn't worry about it. It was 
just dominating her life and making her 
unhappy. But this time she says I am just 
going to have to go through (sic) and move 
out. 
Q. But what was the threat this time? 
A. This time he threatened that he would 
kill her. 
Q. And there is no question that she told 
you this? 
A. That's right. 
(Tr. 1447-48). 
Defendant now argues that the statements by the victim 
should have been excluded for two reasons. First, defendant 
contends that he did not present a self-defense argument at trial 
and thus the statement was inadmissible. Second, defendant 
argues that assuming the evidence was admissible, the lower court 
should have excluded the evidence pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 403 
(1986), since the probative value of the evidence was outweighed 
by the prejudicial effect. The State will first address whether 
the evidence was admissible. 
It is well established that "this Court will not 
disturb the ruling of the trial court on the admissibility of 
evidence unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). In 
cases such as the present one "substantial deference to the trial 
judge's discretion must necessarily be afforded". United States 
v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This Court has 
further held that it "may affirm the trial court's decision to 
admit evidence on any proper ground, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Gravt 717 P.2d 
1312, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
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The State contends that the pre-death statements were 
admissible on two separate grounds: first,as evidence of the 
decedents state of mind; and second, as an admission by a party 
opponent. 
In State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977) this 
Court ruled that pre-death hearsay statements of a victim in 
homicide cases are generally admissible when the defendant claims 
self-defense, that the death was accidental and that the victim 
was the aggressor, or claims that the deceased committed suicide. 
Id. at 1380. The Wauneka Court relied upon Rule 63, Utah R. 
Evid. (1971) which is substantively comparable to Utah R. Evid. 
803(3). See also United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) for an exhaustive analysis as to when pre-death 
statements of a victim should be admitted under the state of mind 
exception. 
In the present case the Judge found that the evidence 
was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 803(3) (1986) because the 
statement went to the decedent's state of mind i.e. whether or 
not she would be likely to be an aggressor towards the defendant. 
Defendant raised each one of the three scenarios 
presented in Wauneka. Defendant initially told everyone that the 
deceased shot herself (Tr. 270, 506, 681, 816, 862, 1302). The 
defendant also testified at the preliminary hearing that the 
deceased committed suicide (Tr. 1319). 
At trial, defendant changed his story and testified 
that the victim died as the result of an accident when the gun 
discharged (Tr. 1297). Defendant also testified that he was 
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afraid of the deceased and the gun discharged in a struggle to 
get the gun away from her (Tr. 1294). 
Once defendant testified that the gun discharged in a 
struggle for the gun this case became a "classic case of self-
defense" similar to People v. Schindler, 273 Cal. App.2d 624, 78 
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). There, the defendant testified that when 
he turned to leave the kitchen he saw the victim sitting at the 
counter with a gun in her hand pointed at him. He lunged for the 
gun, twisted her hand and banged it on the counter. He recalled 
hearing some shots go off but remembered nothing thereafter until 
he was about one and one-half miles from the house. The court 
stated this was a classic instance of self-defense and 
defendant's testimony that the victim had a gun pointed at him 
introduced the issue of who was the assailant. The court further 
stated that a factor bearing on this issue is the victim's state 
of mind prior to the time she was killed, and the likelihood of 
her having taken aggressive action against the defendant. Ld. at 
640. 
This case is also similar to Stedman v. State, 568 P.2d 
350 (Okla. Cr. 1977) wherein the court found that a witness could 
testify as to statements by the deceased that the defendant had 
threatened to kill her. The court reasoned: 
"antecedent declarations of a decedent made 
outside the presence of the defendant are 
admissible in a homicide case for the purpose 
of showing the decedent's state of mind 
toward the defendant or to supply a motive 
for the killing . . . ." (citations omitted) 
Id. at 352. 
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Because defendant presented evidence that he was afraid 
of the deceased, and that the deceased was killed in a struggle 
for the gun, the deceased's state of mind was relevant to the 
present case and the trial court properly admitted the pre-death 
statements into evidence. 
In fact, the statements admitted into evidence, helped 
rather than prejudiced, the defendant's case, Mr. March 
testified that although the defendant threatened to kill the 
deceased, she was not concerned about the threats (Tr. 1448). 
Thus, the jury was free to interpret this testimony as evidence 
that the deceased was not afraid of the defendant and that she 
could have been the aggressor, or that her death could have been 
an accident. The jury was free to draw a myriad of inferences 
from the statement. See People v. Schindler, 273 Cal. App.2d 
624, 78 Cal.Rptr. 633, 641 (1969). 
The State further contends that the pre-death statement 
was relevant as to defendant's intent. Evidence of prior threats 
by the defendant against the victim is competent in a murder 
prosecution to show motive, malice, or ill will between the 
victim and the defendant. People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 570 
P.2d 231 (1977) cert. den. 434 U.S. 1038. Where a marital 
homicide is involved, evidence of a discordant marital 
relationship, including a defendant's prior threats to kill his 
spouse is relevant as to defendant's motive and intent. State v. 
Green, 232 Kan. 116, 652 P.2d 697 (1982). See also I Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence, §201 (13th ed. 1972), IA Wigmore, Evidence 
S105 (Tillers Rev. 1983) 
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The pre-death statement by the victim was also 
admissible as non-hearsay under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (1986), 
an admission by a party-opponent. In the present case the 
witness merely repeated an admission by defendant that he would 
kill his wife if she ever left him. The defendant was free to 
take the stand and deny or explain the statement made by him. 
See McCormick, Evidence S262 (3d ed. 1984). 
The instant case presents a unique situation in that 
the out-of-court statement made by the defendant was once 
removed. Had the victim been aliver her testimony as to 
defendant's statement clearly would have been admissible, however 
because the victim was dead and thus, unable to testify it was 
necessary for the statement to come into court through John 
March. 
In State v. Lew, 69 Cal. Rptr.102, 441 P.2d 942 (1968) 
the court stated that "Iwlhile threats made by defendant are, of 
course, material, they must be testified to by the person who 
heard them, not by someone who was told by someone else that they 
had been made." Id. at 944 (citations omitted). The court went 
on to state that the threats might be relevant in determining 
defendant's intent, however as double hearsay they could not be 
admitted under the admissions exception. Id. at 944. 
The State contends that the Lew case is distinguishable 
from the present case for two reasons. First, an admission by a 
party opponent is admissible under Utah law as non-hearsay, not 
as an exception to the hearsay rule. In Lew, the court appears 
to be operating under a rule wherein an admission by a party 
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opponent is an exception to the hearsay rule. Because the 
admission in the present case is admitted into evidence as non-
hearsay there is no double hearsay issue, i.e. it is not 
necessary to find two exceptions to the hearsay rule before 
admitting the instant statement. See United States v. Basey, 613 
F.2d 198, 201 n.l (9th Cir. 1979) cert. den. 446 U.S. 919 (ruling 
that admission of the defendant's college records to establish 
defendant's address did not pose a double hearsay problem since 
an admission by the defendant as to her address in the records is 
not hearsay within the rules of evidence). See also McCormick, 
Evidence §324.3 (3d ed. 1984). 
The second reason the present case is distinguishable 
from Lew is because the court in Lew found that the statements by 
the deceased were inherently unreliable. Lew, 441 P.2d at 947. 
In the instant case the defendant did not contest the credibility 
or reliability of either the deceased or the witness who 
testified as to the out-of-court statements. 
Defendant next argues that assuming the evidence was 
admissible, it should have been excluded because of the 
prejudicial effect on defendant's case. 
Under Rule 104(a), Utah R. Evid. (1986) it is the trial 
court's responsibility to determine any preliminary questions 
concerning the admissibility of evidence. Rule 403, Utah R. 
Evid. (Supp. 1986) , states several reasons for which a court may 
decide to not admit relevant evidence. Rule 403 provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issue, or misleading the 
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jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence* 
These two rules place the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence within the discretion of the trial court. It is not 
mandatory that the court exclude all unfairly prejudicial 
evidence; the rule merely allows that the court may exclude such 
evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice," 
The admission of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter 
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial 
court's decision to admit evidence will not be overturned absent 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 
1983); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case, this Court should not interfere 
with the trial court's decision to allow the statement into 
evidence unless the trial court so abused its discretion that 
there is a liklihood of injustice. 
The State agrees that the issue of probative value and 
prejudicial effect is an important consideration in these types 
of cases. The court in United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) adequately addressed this issue. There, the 
court stated that if the defense is self-defense, suicide or 
accidental death "the need for such statements overcomes almost 
any possible prejudice", id. at 767. Further, "in the great 
majority of cases the limiting instruction is probably sufficient 
to so minimize the dangers of jury misuse as to prevent most 
serious prejudice". 13. at 764. 
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In the majority of cases wherein courts have ruled that 
pre-death statements were prejudicial and should not have been 
admitted, the court found that the evidence was not relevant 
because one of the three defenses (self-defense, accident, 
suicide) had not been presented as an issue in the case. See 
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977); United States v. 
Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 
378, 630 P.2d 665 (1981); Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21 
(D.C. 1980); Shults v. State, 96 Nev. 742, 616 P.2d 388 (1980); 
People v. White, 401 Mich. 482, 257 N.W.2d 912 (1977). 
In the present case the defendant presented the 
following testimony: 
A. She immediately stepped toward me and 
began presenting the gun to me. And she said 
"I am tired of hearing you threaten to kill 
yourself. If you want to die", she said, 
"here is the gun." She said "there is 
bullets in it, go ahead shoot yourself. Go 
ahead. I am tired of it." And she just 
began hollering at me and pushing the gun 
toward me. 
Q. Okay. And what did you do? 
A. I just kept backing away from her because 
I was afraid. 
Q. Okay. And after you backed away, what 
did you do? 
A. I backed up against the wall, and I kind 
of just slid down against the wall on to my 
knees. 
A. I jumped up towards her to try and get 
the gun. I said something about "okay, I 
will". 
Q. And what happened at that time? 
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A. I reached to try and get ahold of the 
gun, and it scared her. She fell over 
backwards on the bed. 
Q. And then what? 
A. I got ahold of the gun, and I tried to 
pull it away from her with one hand. 
Q. Did anything happen at that time? 
A. The gun discharged. 
(Tr. 1294-96). Based upon this testimony the court found the 
declarations made by the deceased were admissible (Tr. 1390-91) 
and further gave several limiting instructions (Tr. 666, 713-715, 
1079, R.110) . 
Because the defendant presented the defenses of suicide 
and self-defense the relevancy and probative value outweighed any 
prejudicial effect to the defendant. 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence was not properly 
admissible any error was harmless and should be disregarded. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30 (1982), State v. 
Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985). 
First, John March testified that although the defendant 
threatened to kill the deceased if she ever left him, John March 
further stated that the deceased indicated that she was not 
worried about the threats. (Tr. 1448). Thus, the testimony was 
favorable to defendant. Second, the evidence of guilt in the 
present case was overwhelming: several witnesses testified that 
the victim could not have reached the trigger on the rifle and 
that she would have needed to have rigged an apparatus to be able 
to shoot herself (Tr.409, 530, 597); the stippling on the victim 
indicated that the muzzle of the gun was held approximately 18-24 
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inches from the victim (Tr. 597, 638); that if the victim had 
held the gun 18 inches from her head there would have been 
stippling on her arms and hands (Tr. 602, 642) and no such 
stippling was found (Tr. 642); the wound on the back of the 
victimfs head was an entrance, not an exit, wound (Tr. 591, 612, 
622-23); the victim indicated that she was afraid of guns (Tr. 
683, 731, 756, 798, 811, 852); the victim said she would never 
commit suicide (Tr. 697, 902); the victim indicated that she and 
the defendant were suffering from marital problems and she was 
going to leave him( Tr. 692, 829, 897). Because the evidence of 
defendant's guilt was so strong, any error in admission of the 
pre-death statements was harmless and did not affect the 
substantial rights of the defendant. State v. Watts, 85 So. Dak. 
638,188 N.W.2d 913 (1971); Shults v. State, 96 Nev. 742, 616 P.2d 
388 (1980) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the defendant's conviction. 
DATED this £ / day of March, 1987. 
KIMBERLY &. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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